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location-specific public good into a model of group segregation.  We characterize the equilibria of
the model and derive the comparative statics of improvements to the local public goods.  We show
that the dynamics of neighborhood tipping depend on the levels of public goods.  We also show that
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Segregation and Tiebout Sorting: 
Investigating the Link between Investments in Public Goods and Neighborhood Tipping 
 
In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the 
African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of 
discrimination—and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past—are real 
and must be addressed.  Not just with words, but with deeds—by investing in our schools and our 
communities…. 
 —Barack  Obama 
 
1.  Introduction 
Racial segregation of one form or another has been a recurring social concern throughout human 
history.  In the United States, much has changed since Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended de jure racial segregation.  But despite the improvements 
in black educational achievement, the narrowing of black-white income gaps, and even the elec-
tion of the first African-American President, de facto racial segregation continues to be one of 
the country’s most prevalent social issues. 
Addressing this important topic, economists have explored the social mechanisms driving 
segregation.  Schelling (1969, 1971) and Pancs and Vriend (2007) have shown that the dynamics 
of neighborhood "tipping" can force segregated outcomes even when there are tastes for some 
degree of integration.  More recently, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) have shown that, empiri-
cally, white households flee neighborhoods once they become 5-20% minority.  Consistent with 
this phenomenon, Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) and Kiel and Zabel (1996) find that white 
communities do command a price premium in part precisely because of their whiteness.  In 
related work, Hoff and Sen (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004) show how positive exter-
nalities from the activities of richer households can impact community composition.  At the same 
time, Bayer, Fang, and McMillan (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004) show that reducing 
income inequality between groups can actually increase group segregation, because richer mi-
norities need no longer join whites to live in high-income communities. 
While this rich literature has made significant contributions to our understanding of the 
equilibrium properties of segregation, it has almost completely ignored the role played by public  
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goods and/or location-specific amenities in the process of segregation.
1  This is an important 
shortcoming because, as the above epigraph illustrates, many of the policy remedies for reducing 
group inequity focus specifically on investments in minority communities.  Investments in edu-
cation are only one example.  In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) provides Community Development Block Grants (totaling $125B since 1974); the 
US EPA's Superfund and Brownfields programs clean up contaminated sites and encourage 
redevelopment; enterprise zones provide tax incentives for businesses; and the 1992 Federal 
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act steers Fannie and Freddie investments 
to low-income and minority communities.  Clearly, such place-based interventions play a central 
role in efforts to address social concerns associated with segregation. 
In this paper, we advance the literature by introducing an exogenous location-specific 
public good (to be manipulated by public policy) into a model of group segregation.  In this 
sense, we combine features of the segregation and public goods literatures.
2  First, following the 
tradition of Schelling (1969, 1971), we consider preferences for the endogenous demographic 
make-up of the community.
3  Second, following the tradition of Tiebout (1956), we include 
heterogeneity in willingness to pay for public goods.  In particular, we adapt a model of vertical-
ly differentiated communities from Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), a model used in other 
recent and related work (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008, Sethi and Somanathan 2004). 
We combine these two traditions into a general equilibrium model in which households 
choose a community based on both its endogenous demographics and its exogenous public good.  
We then characterize the equilibria of such a model and derive the comparative statics of policy 
                                                 
1 An important exception is Becker and Murphy (2000).  Using several compelling examples, they point out how, 
even in a very simple model, the presence of an exogenous amenity can radically change the demographic sorting 
dynamics.  In this paper, we extend that theme, characterizing the way exogenous public goods and demographics 
interact under more general conditions. 
2 Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) show how these two models can be nested in a more general social interaction 
model. 
3 Throughout our analysis a fundamental assumption is that individuals of a given type tend toward living together 
due to preferences to live with individuals of their own type.  We note, though, that identical results would be 
obtained if the model assumed that concentrations of individuals of a given type lead to social spillovers that dispro-
portionately benefit that type (i.e. concentrations of businesses, community networks, restaurants, non-profit servic-
es, etc.).  
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shocks to the local public goods.  The model generates several results regarding the importance 
of place-based amenities.  First, we establish that, even when sorting is driven by tastes for the 
exogenous public good and not by demographic tastes, some racial segregation will result, with 
the richer group enjoying higher levels of the public good.  Second, we show that introducing 
tastes for endogenous demographic composition can drive further segregation, as suggested by 
Schelling's "tipping model."  By the same token, we show that differences in public good levels 
can alter the responses to demographic composition.  Such dynamics may explain some of the 
variation that Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) observe in their empirical estimates of tipping 
points in U.S. Cities.  As a pragmatic matter, this increased segregation is likely to further the 
differences in the average level of the public good enjoyed by the two groups.  Finally, we show 
that place-based interventions that improve the public good in a low-quality, high-minority 
community may actually increase group segregation, as richer minorities are more likely to 
migrate into the community following the improvement.  Essentially, when differences in public 
goods become less important, group-based sorting begins to dominate income-based sorting on 
the public good. 
In the final section of the paper, we use large changes in the distribution of air pollution 
from industrial facilities that occurred in California between 1990 and 2000 to illustrate the 
predictions of the model.  Consistent with our model’s predictions, we find that large scale im-
provements in the dirtiest sites are associated with increased racial sorting on exposure to toxic 
air pollution. 
2.  Theoretical Model 
In this section, we develop a model of the links between race, demographic composition, public 
goods, and location choice.  In the recent literature, the model is most similar to work by Becker 
and Murphy (2000), Sethi and Somanathan (2004) and Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), but differs 
from these papers in several important respects.  It resembles Becker and Murphy (2000) in 
combining preferences for an exogenous public good with the endogenous demographic com-
munity, but differs in going beyond their simple 2-person model to incorporate continuous in-
come distributions and heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for amenities.  Generalizing their 
model in this way is crucial for evaluating income-based segregation.  Our model also differs  
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from theirs in that each group prefers to be with their own type, rather than a particular "high 
type."  At the same time, our model resembles Sethi and Somanathan (2004) and Banzhaf and 
Walsh (2008) in adapting the vertically differentiated framework of Epple et al. (1984).  But it 
differs from Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), who only consider the exogenous good, in including 
racial groups and demographic preferences.  And it differs from Sethi and Somanathan (2004) in 
including an exogenous public good.
4  Including this public good is obviously essential to ana-
lyzing the kinds of policy shocks that motivate our paper. 
2.1  Model Basics 
We consider a model with two communities, j  {C1, C2}, each composed of an identic-
al set of fixed-size housing stock with measure 0.5.  The price of this fixed housing unit is P
j.  
Residents of these communities comprise two demographic types, r  {b, w}.  Type b, the mi-
nority, has measure β < 0.5 and type w has measure (1-β).  One obvious interpretation of these 
types is as racial groups (w for white and b for blacks). However, in principle they could 
represent any pair of groups with the minority group being poorer. 
There is heterogeneity in income Y within each type, which is described by the conti-
nuous distribution functions Fr(Y).  We impose the following two assumptions on the income 
distributions of type b and w individuals: 
 
and 
Fw(Y) ≤ Fb(Y) for all Y (1)   
     
M       
M       
    
.5  1 2  
1  
     
M       
M  .  (2) 
The first condition requires that the population of type-w individuals is richer than the population 
of type-b individuals in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.  The second condition 
limits the difference in income distributions between the two groups.  In particular, it states that 
                                                 
4 We also provide a more general characterization of the equilibria of our model, including integrated and segregated 
equilibria.  Sethi and Somanathan (2004) focus on integrated equilibria.  
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some positive measure of each group falls in the top half of the pooled income distribution. 
Each individual is assumed to consume one unit of housing and to have preferences over 
a numeraire good x (with a price set to unity), an exogenous community public good level G
j and 
endogenous community demographic composition.  Tastes for demographic composition are 
captured by
   
             
  , where       
  is the proportion of residents in community j who 
are of type r.  Individuals of each type experience the same service flow from the public good.  
However, they view the demographic composition differently, so D is indexed by type r as well 
as location j. 
Conditional on choosing location j, utility for an individual of type r and income Y is giv-
en by equation (3): 
    
            ,    ,   
     =  U[x, Vr
j].  (3) 
The function U(·) is continuous and increasing at a decreasing rate in both of its arguments, and 
V(·) is increasing in both arguments.  More compactly, let    
          ,   
  .  Consumption x is 
simply income net of housing costs.  We impose the Inada condition that     ∞  as   0 .  We 
also impose the following condition on   : 
   1 2           1 2  1              0,0.5  
and 
   2 1           2            0,0.5 . 
This condition guarantees that when        , for any feasible sorting, each type prefers the 
community with more of its own type.  For example, if β=0.25, the condition requires that type-w 
individuals prefer an all-w community to a community with less than 50% w and type-b individ-
uals prefer a community that is more than 50% type b to an all-w community.  This condition 
does not imply that preferences are monotonic.  To the contrary, in general this assumption is 
consistent with a wide range of preferences including for example any symmetric "bliss point" 
specification,   
 = g[abs(      
 -ρr)], where     0 ,    1        1 ,    and        1 .  While 
this restriction is not necessary for solving the model, we restrict the preference domain to these  
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cases because they are consistent with US racial preferences previously estimated in the litera-
ture.
5 
Finally, without loss of generality, we assume that when public good levels differ the lev-
el of the public good is higher in Community 2 than in Community 1:           .  And, because 
we are working with an assignment model, to close the model we normalize the price of housing 
in Community 1 to zero:      0 .   This normalization allows us to work with households' wil-
lingness to pay to live in C2, given Vr
j and Y.  Denote this willingness to pay as BidYr. 
Equilibrium in the model is characterized by a sorting of individuals across the two 
communities and a price level in Community 2, P
C2, such that: 
E1.  In each community, for each type,       
  arises from the sorting of individuals:   
      
   
    ,  
0.5
, 
where     ,   is the measure of the set of individuals of type r choosing community j.   
E2.  Each individual resides in his preferred community.  That is, for all type-r individu-
als choosing to live in community j: 
          ,    ,   
                 ,     ,   
     
E3.  Housing markets clear, so the measure of individuals choosing each community is 
equal to 0.5. 
The structure of the model allows us to simplify the characterization of the sorting of in-
dividuals across communities.  Specifically, the concavity of U( ) in the numeraire and in V( ), 
combined with the assumption that each household consumes an identical and fixed quantity of 
housing, implies that within each type preferences satisfy the "single crossing" property in    
and    
 .  This in turn implies that equilibria in the model will exhibit stratification by income 
                                                 
5 In particular, the survey literature suggests that the appropriate levels for ρw and ρb are around 0.9 and 0.5 respec-
tively (Farley et al. 1978 and Farley and Krysan 2002).  Furthermore, it is reasonable to focus on this portion of the 
parameter space, as such preferences are consistent with socially relevant phenomenon of "white-flight" or neigh-
borhood tipping recently documented by Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), as well as the price premium for white 




6  In other words, in equilibrium, for each type there is a boundary income,     , 
such that all individuals of type r with incomes greater than     , choose to live in the community 
that that type views as more desirable (i.e. the community with the higher values of    
  .
7 
In analyzing equilibria in the model, it is particularly useful to consider these boundary 
individual’s willingness to pay to be in Community 2 (relative to Community 1).  Define         
to be the price level in Community 2 that makes these individuals indifferent between the two 
communities.  Recalling that P
C1 is normalized to 0,         is implicitly defined by: 
        ,     ,   
                         ,     ,   
    .  (4)
By definition,         makes these boundary individuals indifferent between the two communities.  
Note that the continuity of   .  and     .  implies that          is continuous in
    and
   . 
2.2.  Equilibria in the Model 
To provide intuition about the equilibrium properties of the model, we begin by working 
through a four-step process for evaluating the potential for different demographic sortings to be 
supported as equilibria.  In this section, we also build intuition by working with one specific 
example. 
In the first step, we note that the entire demographic profile of a given sorting of house-
holds can be expressed solely as a function of       
  , the proportion of Community 1 that is 
type w.  In particular, if one knows the proportion of Community 1 that is type w, the proportion 
of Community 1 that is type b follows directly.  Similar logic identifies       
   and      
  : 
       
    =  1 -       
  ;  (5)
                                                 
6 See Epple et al. (1984) for discussion of single crossing and stratification in equilibrium sorting models. 
7 Formally, given    
      
 , the boundary income is defined as that income at which for all       ,   , 
      , 
  .  
When individuals of type r reside in both communities, a type r individual with the boundary income is indifferent 
between the two communities.  However, there are equilibria where all type-b individuals locate in the same com-
munity.  In this case          
    when Vb
j is higher in the community in which they reside and          
    when Vb
j is 
higher in the other community.  
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   =  2(1 – β) -       
  ; and  (6)
       
    =  1 -       
    =        
   + 2β - 1.  (7)
We graph these relationships in Panel 1 of Figure 1.  Given the requirement that housing markets 
clear (equilibrium condition E3), these relationships are purely tautological and are the same for 
all possible parameterizations of the model.  Given the complete identification of       
 , the 
demographic components of     
  .  can be expressed as a function of       
  ,    
   
  
        
   . 
In the second step, we compute    
          ,   
   for both communities and types, again as 
a function of       
  .  Panel 2 of Figure 1 illustrates one particular specification with bliss-
point preferences over demographic composition.  In particular, the figure illustrates results for 
β=0.25, Dr
j = (       
 - ρr)
2, ρb=0.5, ρw=0.9, and Vr
j = Dr
j + G
j.  That is, V(·) is separable in D 
and G, and D is defined by a quadratic function around a bliss point ρ, with type w preferring 
more segregation.  (As noted above, this parameterization of Dr is consistent with previous find-
ings for racial attitudes and in the US.)  The utility function U(·) is Cobb-Douglas in consump-








The figure shows that, for this example, the utility received by type w in C1 is increasing 
in       
   up to the bliss point at 0.9, at which point it begins to fall.  Type-w's utility in C2 
likewise is increasing in       
   up to the same bliss point, but this is mapped in the figure as 
being decreasing in       
   up to the bliss point where       
   = 0.6 (which is where       
   
= 0.9).  On the other hand, type-b utility in C1 is decreasing in       
   while type-b utility in 
C2 is increasing in       
  .  In this example, since β=0.25, type b is always below its bliss point 
of 0.5.  Note that even with these bliss point preferences, both types always prefer the communi-
ty with the larger percentage of their own type.  This is guaranteed by our condition on demo-
graphic preferences and the set of feasible profiles identified in Panel 1.  Finally, note that be-
cause in this example G
C1=G
C2, both groups are indifferent when the community compositions  
9 
 
are identical, which occurs where       
   = 0.75. 
In the third step, we identify the boundary incomes associated with the sorting implied by 
each value of       
  .  These boundary incomes are a function of the utility values computed in 
the previous step and the income distributions.  For example, suppose β=0.25 and       
   is 
0.6.  By Equation 5,       
   is 0.9.  In turn, it follows that 2/5 of type w are in Community 1.  
Suppose further that with       
   = 0.6, the values of G
j imply that type w individuals prefer 
Community 2.  Then by single crossing, we know that      must be equal to    
    
 
  .  In general, 
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  (9)
We can similarly characterize the derivatives of these boundary incomes with respect to 
      : 
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Panel 3 shows, for our example, the boundary incomes as a function of       
  .  Be-
cause this example uses uniform income distributions, the boundary incomes are linear in 
      
  .  When       
   is below 1-β, type-w individuals prefer Community 2.  As a result,  
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single-crossing implies that they will sort such that the richest type-w individuals locate in C2.  
Consequently, the boundary income is that of the poorest type-w individual in C2 (alternatively 
the richest type-w individual in C1).  As       
   at first increases toward 0.75, the measure of 
type-w individuals living in C2 must decrease.  Thus, the boundary income must increase.  But 
when       
   increases above 1-β, the relative ranking of the communities changes and rich 
type-w individuals now locate in C1.  Thus, the boundary income is now decreasing in       
  .  
Because in this example the community switch occurs where type-w individuals are equally 
distributed between the two communities, the boundary income function is continuous with a 
kink at the point where    
      
 .  As discussed below, in cases where public good levels differ 
and indifference between the two communities occur where       
   ≠ 1-β, there will be a dis-
continuity in the boundary income function. 
While the boundary income function for type b looks similar to that of the type w, the un-
derlying process is different.  When       
   is below 1-β, type-b individuals prefer Communi-
ty 1.  Thus, by single crossing, the type-b boundary income will be that of the poorest type-b 
individual in C1 (alternatively the richest type-b individual in C2).  At the extreme, when 
      
   = 1-2β = 0.5, all type-b individuals are in C1 and      = Yb
Min = 0. 
Based on the discussion to this point, we make the following observations. 
Observation 1.  Some type-w individuals always live in both communities.  This must be 
the case because the measure of type-w individuals is greater than 0.5.  More specifically, 
the share of type w in any community can never fall below 1-2β.  In contrast, all type-b 
individuals can reside in only one of the two communities. 
Observation 2.  When Vw
C1 ≠ Vw
C2, there is some      at which type-w individuals are in-
different.  All type-w individuals with income higher than      will reside in the more de-
sirable (to w) community and poorer type-w individuals will live in the community that 
type-w individuals find less desirable.  Moreover,      can never drop below 
   
    0.5       1      ⁄  .  In contrast, it is possible that b's boundary income may fall to 
   
M  . 




C2 ≥ 0.  This relationship must hold.  Otherwise, every type w 
individual would prefer to live in the community with higher Vw and lower price, and the 
demand for housing would exceed supply in that community.  Further, P
C2 =        .  
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These observations are general to the model and do not depend on the specific assumptions 
underlying the example depicted in Figure 1. 
As noted in Observation 1, because β<0.5, it is possible for all type-b individuals to live 
in the same community.  We will refer to equilibria where all type-b individuals live in the same 
community as "segregated" and equilibria where some type-b individuals live in both communi-
ties as "integrated."  We make the following observations about these two cases. 
Observation 4.  For segregation of types with all type-b individuals locating in C1 to be 
supportable as an equilibrium, it must be the case that         ≤        .  (Otherwise, if 
        >        , then the boundary type-b individual would outbid the boundary type-w 




C1, then         ≥ 









C2, then 0 >         ≥        .  Note also that if Vb
C1 > Vb
C2, then      =    
M   = 
0.  Otherwise,      =    
M  .  The opposite and symmetric cases hold for equilibria where all 
type-b individuals locate in C2. 
Observation 5.  In any integrated equilibrium, both types must agree on which communi-
ty is more desirable, and         =        .  Additionally, some members of each type must 
be willing to pay to live in the more desirable community (   
M   <         =         < 
   
M  ). 
The upshot of these observations is that equilibria can be identified by an analysis of the 
bids of individuals at the boundary incomes.  We use the term "boundary income bid function" 
for the mapping from       
   to these bids.  Note that the boundary income bid function for 
type r is not the willingness to pay function for a specific individual, but a bid function over an 
endogenous income level (the boundary incomes associated with each sorting). 
If at any integrated allocation the two groups' boundary income bid functions are equal, 
        =        , then that integrated allocation can be supported as an equilibrium.  Alternatively, 
a segregated equilibrium with C2 all-w exists if at such an allocation         ≤        .  Finally, a 
segregated equilibrium with C1 all-w exists if at such an allocation         ≤        . 
The derivative of the boundary income bid function with respect to       
   is given by 
Equation (10):  
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1
  
  ,  (10)
where   
  is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the numeraire, evaluated in 
Community j at the appropriate income (i.e.     ).  All other derivatives are similarly defined.  The 
expression shows two effects.  The first term inside the brackets captures the effect of the change 
in the boundary income that is associated with the change in       
  .  The second term inside 
the brackets captures the effect of changes in the V(·) function that are associated with an in-
crease in       
  . 
Panel 4 of Figure 1 plots the boundary income bid functions associated with the previous-
ly defined example.  Recall from the second step that, because the G's are equal in the two com-
munities, when       
   = 0.75 the demographic compositions are identical as well, so both 
groups are indifferent between communities at that point.  Accordingly, Panel 4 shows that, for 
each type, the boundary income bid function is zero when       
   = 0.75. 
Type-w individuals prefer Community 2 when       
   < 0.75, so the bid function is pos-
itive.  Conversely, when       
   > 0.75, type-w individuals prefer Community 1 and the bid 
function is negative.  Using Equation (10), we find that the type-w boundary income bid function 
is monotonically decreasing in       
   for this example.  This relationship arises because the 
utility effect of changes in       
  , shown in the second term of Equation (10), is negative and 
always dominates the boundary income effect, shown in the first term of Equation (10), which is 
positive. 
For type-b individuals, preferences for the communities are the reverse of those of type-
w.  The bid function is always negative for       
   < 0.75 and always positive for       
   > 
0.75.  In terms of the slope of the bid function, the basic dynamics are the same as with type-w 
individuals, except that for very low or very high levels of       
   the change associated with 
the boundary income dominates the change associated with closing the gap in V(·).  This result 
differs from that for type-w individuals because of the steeper slope of      /        
  , which 
arises from the fact that there are fewer type-b individuals.  
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Evaluating the figure, we can see that this example has three equilibria.  At the far left, 
type-w individuals are willing to pay to live in Community 2, type-b individuals are not, and C2 
is all-w.  At the far right is the opposite and symmetric segregated equilibrium.  In the middle, 
there is an integrated equilibrium in which the two communities have the same composition, and 
all individuals of both types are indifferent between the two communities. 
2.3  Characterizing the equilibria and their comparative statics 
We now characterize the equilibria and comparative statics of the model.  We first estab-
lish the existence of equilibria in the model. 
Proposition 1. 
For preference functions and income distributions satisfying conditions (1) through (3) in 
Section 2.1, there is at least one allocation that satisfies equilibrium conditions E.1 to E3. 
Proof.   
Consider the sorting at       
   = 1-2β.  (This is the point where       
   = 1 and is de-
picted as the left-hand side of Panel 4 in Figure 1).  At this point either         ≤         or 
        >        .  In the former case this point represents a segregated equilibrium and 
thus existence is trivial.  Consider now the sorting at       
   = 1.  Again, at this point 
either         ≤         or         >        .  And again, in the former case, this point 
represents a segregated equilibrium.  Finally, we must consider the possibility that 
        >         at       
   = 1-2β and         >         at       
   = 1.  But in this case, 
by continuity, the boundary income bid functions must cross at some point, where 
        =        , which is also an equilibrium. 
In addition to the existence of such equilibria, we are also concerned with stability of 
equilibria.  We adopt the following definition of local stability. 
Definition 
Let an epsilon set of marginal individuals of type r in community j, be defined as follows: 
  , 
         
                ,                       
      
  
                     ,                     
      
   . 
An equilibrium is locally stable if there exists a  , such that for any 4-tuple of epsilon 
sets (  , 
  ,   , 
  ,   , 
  ,   , 
  ) each having measure     , switching   , 
   with   , 
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across the two communities results in         >         and switching   , 
   with   , 
   
across the two communities results in         >        .
8 
Essentially, this definition requires that when a small set of "almost indifferent" type-w 
individuals in one community switch with a small set of "almost indifferent" type-b individuals 
in the other community, they prefer to switch back.  It insures that individuals moved from 
Community 2 will outbid the individuals moved from Community 1; thus reversing the perturba-
tion and restoring the initial equilibrium.  When this condition is not met, an equilibrium is 
unstable and the perturbation causes the communities to tip toward segregation (or toward a 
different integrated equilibrium). 
As discussed above, equilibria occur either at corners (the case of segregation) or in the 
interior (the case of integration).  Whenever corner equilibria exist, they will be locally stable.  
For interior solutions, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the local stability conditions are 
satisfied whenever the type-b boundary income bid function crosses the type-w boundary income 
bid function from above. 
Additionally, by analogy to a "regular" Arrow-Debreu economy, we can define a regular 
sorting as one in which, at each point where         =        , 
        
      
    
        
      
  .  In the case of a 
regular sorting there are an odd number of equilibria.  Moreover, if there are n such equilibria, 
(n+1)/2 are stable, the analog of the index theorem in our model.
9 
                                                 
8 In the degenerate case where    
      
 , this definition collapses to switching any two arbitrary sets of individuals 
having measure  . 
9 The proof follows the logic of Proposition 1, and we sketch it briefly.  Consider the sorting at       
   = 1-2β and 
consider two cases.  In case 1,         ≤         and this is a stable equilibrium (with C2 all-w).  Consider three sub-
cases.  (1a) If the bid functions never cross, then this is the only equilibrium.  (1b) If the bid functions cross an even 
number of times, there is only the one segregated equilibrium plus the even integrated equilibria, totaling an odd 
number of equilibria.  In addition, half the integrated equilibria will occur with type-b's boundary income bid func-
tion cutting type-w's from above, indicating stability.  Thus, (n+1)/2  are stable.  (1c) If the bid functions cross an 
odd number of times, there will be a second segregated equilibrium at       
   = 1, with         ≤        .  That is, 
there will be an odd number of integrated equilibria plus two segregated equilibria, totaling an odd number of 
equilibria.  In addition, if there are m integrated equilibria, (m-1)/2 will be stable.  With     2 , this means there 
will be (n+1)/2 stable equilibria again.  Though we omit them for brevity, these sub-cases can be repeated for case 2, 
where                   at       
   = 1-2β, to complete the proof. 
     Note here the importance of the notion of the "regular" economy.  Without it, there may be additional equilibria 
where the two groups' boundary income bid functions are just tangent, or even an interval of equilibria.  Debreu  
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The example illustrated in Figure 1 has three equilibria, and only the two symmetric se-
gregated equilibria are stable.  This result is not limited to this example.  For any specification 
satisfying the general preferences in Section 2.1, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 2. 
Whenever          , there will be three equilibria:  two stable segregated equilibria 
with       
    = 1 and       
   = 1-2β, respectively, and one unstable integrated equili-
brium with PCTw
C1 = 1-β. 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
When there are no differences in the public good, individuals sort solely based on demographics, 
resulting in segregation. 
We now turn to an analysis of cases where public good levels differ across communities.  
To build intuition for how relationships change when public goods differ, Figure 2 replicates the 
example from Figure 1 but now for a case with unequal public good levels (G
C1=0.9 and G
C2=1).  
Because the set of feasible demographic compositions is independent of public good levels, the 
first panel of Figure 2 is identical to Figure 1.  Comparing Panel 2 in Figure 2 to Figure 1 reveals 
that when     falls,    
   shifts down for both types.  As a result, type-b individuals are now 
indifferent between the two communities when        
   = 0.65 (instead of at .75 in the previous 
case where          ).  For type-w individuals the indifference point is now at        
   = 0.92 
(versus 0.90 in the previous case). 
Panel 3 shows the impact of the differential public good levels on the boundary income 
functions.  When public goods were equated across communities, both types were indifferent at 
the point where       
   =       
  .  As a result, even though relative preferences for communi-
ties switch at this point, reversing the income sorting, the boundary income functions were conti-
nuous (though kinked) at the indifference point.  Differential public good levels separate the 
indifference point for the two types moving them away from equal sorting.  Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1970) shows that the equilibria in an Arrow-Debreu economy are regular "almost everywhere" in the set of prefe-
rence parameters and income distributions.  Although a proof is beyond the scope of this paper, reasoning analo-
gously it seems likely that the set of parameters that would generate irregular sorting have measure zero in the 
parameter space.  Certainly, we have never found an example with irregular sortings.  
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boundary income functions now have a discontinuity at each type's indifference point. 
Finally, Panel 4 of Figure 2 presents the boundary income bid functions under the new 
public good levels.  In spite of the discontinuity in boundary incomes, The boundary bid func-
tions are continuous at this point.  This continuity, which will always hold, occurs because the 
bid function at the point of indifference is by definition equal to zero and approaches zero conti-
nuously from both sides. In terms of potential equilibria, the model remains qualitatively similar 
to the case where the public good levels were equal.  There are still two stable segregated equili-
bria and one unstable integrated equilibrium, with the location of the unstable integrated equili-
brium now shifted slightly to the right to where       
   = 0.76.  Thus, for small differences in 
public good levels, it is possible to support a segregated equilibrium with all type-b individuals 
in the high public good community.  However, comparison of the bid functions in Figures 1 and 
2 suggest that, at least for this example, if the public good gap were to increase further, then this 
equilibrium will no longer be supported.  As we shall see below, this result holds in general. 
As the public good gap increases, it becomes difficult to make general statements regard-
ing the character of equilibria.  As is clear from an examination of Equation 10, the slopes of the 
bid functions are highly sensitive to local variations in the density of the income functions and 
the relative curvatures of the utility functions.  For instance, it is relatively straightforward to 
generate examples with multiple segregated and multiple stable and unstable integrated equili-
bria when the public good differentials are moderate in size. 
Nevertheless, the model does provide sharp predictions regarding equilibria for cases 
with "small" or "large" differences in public goods, and a comparison of these two polar cases 
provides important policy insights.  We begin by considering the case with small differences in 
the public goods levels.  As stated in Proposition 2, the case where the level of public goods is 
the same in each community always has one unstable integrated equilibrium and two symmetric 
stable segregated equilibria.  This proposition extends to a measure of    as stated in Proposi-
tion 3. 
Proposition 3 
For any given level of    , there exists       <     such that for all       <     <      
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there will be exactly three equilibria, two symmetric stable segregated equilibria and one 
unstable integrated equilibrium. 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
Proposition 3 addresses the case where differences between the public good levels are small 
enough that demographic preferences dominate in the determination of equilibria.  It states that 
in this range, the stable equilibria are characterized by segregation. 
We also note that while difficult to formalize because of the complexity of the boundary 
bid function relationship presented in Equation 10, it is the case that for all “standard” paramete-
rizations of the model that we have evaluated, the equilibrium with the lower income minority 
group in the low public good community is stable over a much broader range of public good 
differences than is the equilibrium with this lower income minority group in the high public good 
community.  
Consider now the opposite extreme, where differences in public goods are very large and 
effectively drive the sorting behavior, swamping any effect of the demographics.  Intuitively, this 
case will resemble earlier results from Epple et al. (1984) and other related papers with only a 
public goods component.  In particular, individuals will be stratified by income instead of segre-
gated by race. 
To operationalize this intuition in our model, assume that, for given levels of 
   ,   
  ,and    
  ,                            ∞ .
10  Then, at the limit, the boundary income bid 
functions are equal to the boundary incomes themselves, and both types view Community 2 as 
more desirable regardless of demographic sorting.  By construction (Condition 2), the richest 
type-b individual is richer than the boundary type-w individual when       
   = 1-2β, and the 
poorest type-b individual is poorer than the boundary type-w individual when        
   = 1.  As 
a result, the boundary income of type-b individuals crosses the boundary income of type-w indi-
viduals exactly once from above.  This case has a single equilibrium.  The equilibrium is stable 
                                                 
10 This condition essentially says that the public good is a necessity.  For example, while there may be great hetero-
geneity in the marginal values for air quality, nobody can live without some minimum level, below which they 
would suffocate.  While this condition is sufficient for the emergence of a single integrated equilibrium as public 
good differences increase, it is by no means necessary.  
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and integrated, with all individuals with income above the population median income locating in 
Community 2.  Proposition 4 formalizes this result. 
Proposition 4 
Assume that, for given levels of    ,   
  ,       
  ,                             ∞ .  Then, 
there exists       such that for all                   there is a single equilibrium that is 
integrated and stable. 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
That is, when public good differences are sufficiently large, the communities will be integrated 
by group but stratified by income.  In general, how "large" the differences in G must be will 
depend on the preferences and income distributions. 
Even with perfect stratification by income, the high public good community will still 
have a higher proportion of type-w residents than C1: 
Proposition 5 
Under the conditions of Proposition 4, for sufficiently low G
C1,       
   >       
  . 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
The proof of Proposition 5 follows intuitively from Condition (1), first-order stochastic domin-
ance in the income distributions.  Essentially, since type-w are richer on average, when there is 
perfect stratification by income then the richer community also has a higher share of type w.  In 
this way, our model captures as a special case the earlier insights from McGuire (1974), who 
showed how segregation can be driven by group differences in the willingness to pay for public 
goods.  It also speaks to important policy issues.  For example, the "environmental justice" 
movement has shown that minorities are disproportionately exposed to pollution (e.g. Bullard 
2000).  Thus, our model formalizes the idea that discrimination (at least in pollution patterns) is 
not necessary to drive observed correlations in the consumption of public goods such as envi-
ronmental quality.  Those correlations may be driven by differences in incomes and sorting on 
amenities (see also Been 1994). 
To summarize the discussion so far, when public good levels in the two communities are 
relatively similar, all equilibria are segregated.  At intermediate differences in public good levels 
it is difficult to make general statements about equilibria.  However, the stable segregated equili-
bria with all type-b individuals in Community 1 will exist over at least part of this range.  Final- 
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ly, when differences in public good levels are high there will be a single stable equilibrium with 
integration. 
To further illustrate the implications of Propositions 3 and 4, Figure 3 displays the bid 
functions for the specification of Figures 1 and 2—fixing the level of G
C2 at 1 and varying the 
level of G
C1 from 0.25 to 1.  When G
C1=0.25 the public goods difference is large enough that the 
outcome resembles the limiting notion of Proposition 4 where the bid functions equal the boun-
dary income functions.  When G
C1=0.25 there is a single stable integrated equilibrium.  As G
C1 
increases to 0.5, the bid functions no longer track the boundary income functions as closely, but 
there is still a single stable and integrated equilibrium.  When G
C1=0.7, the bid functions no 
longer cross and the only equilibrium is a stable segregated equilibria with all type-b individuals 
located in the low public good community.  In other words, closing the gap in public goods by 
improving the public good level in Community 1 causes a change from integrated equilibrium to 
segregated equilibrium.  This stable segregated equilibrium exists in this example for all 1 ≥ 
G
C1 > 0.6.  When G
C1=0.8, this stable segregated equilibrium continues to exist.  In addition, two 
new equilibria appear, an unstable and a stable integrated equilibrium.  Finally, once G
C1=0.9, 
we are in the realm of Proposition 3 with two stable segregated equilibria and one unstable inte-
grated equilibrium.  The figure illustrates the results of Propositions 3 and 4.  Namely, when 
public good differences are large, integrated equilibria (with income stratification) are especially 
salient.  When public good differences shrink, segregated equilibria are especially salient. 
Figure 4 shows how the equilibria evolve as G
C1 improves.  On the vertical axis it shows 
levels of PCTw
C1 that are sustainable as equilibria for different levels of G
C1, shown on the 
horizontal axis.  The figure continues to illustrate the example shown in Figure 3.  The far left of 
the figure, at very low levels of G
C1, has a single integrated equilibrium.  As G
C1 improves, 
PCTw
C1 decreases slightly as richer minorities migrate into C1.  Then a "tipping point" is 
reached, with type w "fleeing" C1 to the full extent possible in equilibrium, with the communi-
ties becoming completely segregated.  Eventually, as G
C1 improves to the point that it is better 
than G
C2, rich whites begin to move in and the process slowly reverses, until another tipping 
point is reached and "gentrification" leads to the community becoming all-w.  Finally, as the 
public good gap between C1 and C2 gets “large” we return to income sorting (now with the  
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richest households locating in C1. 
2.4  Discussion 
These results speak to at least three important policy and empirical issues in the literature.  
The first and most central to our application are policy concerns centered on the correlation 
between low-income and/or minority populations and the levels of local public goods like public 
school quality, public safety, parks and green space, and environmental quality.  The "environ-
mental justice movement," for example, has highlighted such correlations with air pollution and 
local toxic facilities (see e.g. Been 1994, Bullard 2000).  Our model confirms the intuition that 
such sorting can be the outcome of sorting by income when there are substantial income diffe-
rentials between groups.  More interestingly, racial preferences can strengthen this result, direct-
ly and indirectly.  First, with the high-G community mostly white, it will be less attractive to 
minorities.  Second, it will also be more expensive simply because of its whiteness.  Both factors 
will tend to drive even fairly rich minorities into the minority district (a theme raised in the law 
literature by, e.g., Ford 1994). 
However, both advocates and analysts have raised concerns that improving public goods 
in low-quality neighborhoods may drive gentrification (Sieg et al. 2004, Banzhaf and McCor-
mick 2006, NEJAC 2006).  While there may well be price effects, our model suggests that it is 
unlikely that public good improvements will lead to large turnovers in racial or other group 
compositions.  To the contrary, Propositions 3 and 4 together imply that improvements in public 
goods may increase segregation.
11  This theoretical result is generally consistent with empirical 
studies of gentrifying neighborhoods that find little evidence of differential displacement of 
minority groups.
12  Perhaps most relevant on this point is the recent empirical finding of McKin-
nish et al. (2010) that gentrifying neighborhoods are attractive to highly educated black families.  
Of course, the link is not as direct as one might hope given that this literature remains mute on 
                                                 
11 This of course depends on which of the two stable equilibria obtain.  However, a move to the stable segregated 
equilibria with all type-b individuals in the high public good community would require a much larger shift in popu-
lations than is required for a move to the stable segregated equilibria with all type-b individuals in the low public 
good community. 
12 See for instance Vigdor (2002), Freeman and Braconi (2004), Freeman (2005), and McKinnish et al. (2010).  
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the underlying drivers of the gentrification that it seeks to study. 
A second application of our model is to the recent revival of interest in "tipping models" 
of racial segregation (e.g. Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008, Pancs and Vriend, 2007).  Although 
Schelling (1969, 1971) noted the link between public goods and demographic sorting in his early 
work, the role of public goods has generally been under appreciated in models of segregation.  
For example, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) recently have conducted a study of "tipping" 
behavior in US Cities.  They identify tipping points using tract-level data, looking for break 
points in the change in the white population as a flexible function of the baseline minority com-
position of the tract.  They assume tipping points are identical for all tracts within a metropolitan 
area.  However, our model suggests this is unlikely to be the case.  When two tracts have large 
differences in locational amenities, integration is supportable even with large proportions of 
minorities.  Conversely, when two tracts have small differences in amenities, only low levels of 
integration can be supported before tipping occurs.   
Figure 5 illustrates this point.  The first panel in the figure corresponds to the last panel in 
Figure 3 (i.e., the case where G1=G2=1), but with the x-axis re-normalized to represent the pro-
portion of a community's residents who are type-b rather than type-w.  In this symmetric case, 
both communities have a tipping point where the proportion of type-b equals 0.25.  "White 
flight" occurs where PROPb exceeds 0.25.  The second and third panels in Figure 5 correspond 
to the fourth panel in Figure 3 (i.e., the case where G1=0.8 and G2=1).  Panel two depicts Com-
munity 1.  With these values of G, C1 experiences white flight whenever PROPb exceeds 0.21.
13  
Comparing the first and second panels, we are essentially decreasing G from 1 to 0.8 while 
holding G in the relevant substitute community constant at 1.  This is sufficient to lower the 
tipping point from a proportion of type-b of 0.25 to 0.21. 
The third panel of Figure 5 depicts Community 2 in the same "city" as the second panel.  
Here, tipping occurs whenever PROPb exceeds 0.29.  Comparing the first and third panels of this 
figure, we hold constant the value of the public goods in Community 2 at G=1.  But in panel 1 
                                                 
13 There is also a stable integrated equilibrium where PROPb=0.11, but as this is a stable equilibrium increases in 
PROPb above this level but below 0.21 do not trigger tipping.  A tipping point is not reached until PROPb exceeds 
0.21 in this community.  
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the substitute community has G=1 while in panel 3 the substitute community has G=0.8.  This is 
sufficient to move the tipping point from a proportion of type-b of 0.25 to 0.29.  Thus, not only 
does the level of public goods in a community determine the tipping point, but so too does the 
level of the public goods in the relevant substitute community. 
This sensitivity of the tipping point to public goods may be one reason more noise ap-
pears in Card, Mas and Rothstein’s predictions about demographic changes around their esti-
mated tipping point (see their Figure 4).  Our model suggests more precise estimates of tipping 
points could be obtained by adjusting for differences in public goods using multiple regression or 
other methods. 
Third, our results may help explain recent empirical puzzles about the demographic ef-
fects of environmental cleanup.  As noted above, the environmental justice literature shows that 
the presence of minority households is correlated with undesirable facilities like hazardous waste 
sites.  But recently, using difference-in-difference methods, Cameron and McConnaha (2006), 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), and Vigdor (2009) have found that improvements to such sites 
do not appear to reduce these correlations.  They suggest this may be because of long-lasting 
"stigma" of the sites or the ineffectualness of cleanup.  Our results suggest another explanation:  
the reduced form relationship may change after a cleanup, so that the correlation between pollu-
tion and race becomes even stronger, not weaker as supposed in the literature.  To illustrate this 
point, consider the difference-in-difference relationships that come out of the previous example.  
Figure 6 plots the relationship between G
j and       
  for our two communities, with G
C2=1 and 
G
C1 taking on each of the values used in Figure 3 (0.25 to 0.9).  The lines in the bottom panel 
shows the cross-sectional relationships for each value of G
C1.  The lines illustrating the cross-
sectional relationships become successively steeper as G
C1 improves, consistent with our finding 
that racial correlations strengthen with improving G
C1, as sorting on race becomes more salient.  
The top panel shows difference-in-differences for each successive improvement in G
C1.  Togeth-
er, the two panels clearly show that while the cross-sectional differences have the expected 
negative slope, the difference-in-differences have the opposite slope. 
One way to think about this problem is in terms of a mis-specification of the standard dif-
ference-in-differences regression.  Our model suggests that the correlation between race and  
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public goods increases as the low public good community sees increases in its public good level.  
Consider the reduced form relationships between minority compositions and pollution in com-
munity j in two time periods (0 and 1): 
                                                   (11) 
                                                 ,  (12) 
with time-specific intercepts t in each of the two time periods, time-invariant fixed effects for 
each community, αj, and time-specific pollution effects β1 > β0 > 0.  First differencing the equa-
tions leads to: 
  Δ                Δ      Δ                                      Δ      (13) 
If              is omitted from equation (13), the estimate of β1 will be biased downward 
when Δ          and            are negatively correlated (i.e. if the dirtiest areas are 
being cleaned up).  In this case, the problem may simply be one of omitted variables.  Including 
baseline pollution levels is suggested as a control.  Although this kind of Oaxaca procedure is 
common in the labor literature, the literature on local public goods has tended to ignore its im-
portance.  Our model shows why it is important to take account of the changes in the reduced 
form relationships. 
3.  Empirical Example 
In essence, our model predicts that an exogenous improvement in public goods that closes the 
public goods gap across neighborhoods will change locational equilibria in such a way as to put 
more emphasis on sorting by race.
14  As discussed above, the model's theoretical predictions are 
generally consistent with recent empirical results on gentrification and the impacts of environ-
mental remediation.  However, these empirical results are rather weak evidence as to the model’s 
                                                 
14 It might seem equally true that it should put less emphasis on sorting by income.  However, this is not necessarily 
so.  The reason can be seen in the logic of Figure 6.  As G
C1 rises and PCTw
C1 falls, both effects lead to a higher 
absolute value of the slope in the cross-sectional relationship between race and G.  In contrast, as G
C1 rises and mean 
income rises in C1, there are two offsetting effects on the cross-sectional relationship between income and G.    
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empirical relevance.  Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no extant work that bears directly 
on this question.  As an initial attempt to fill this gap, we consider the demographic shifts asso-
ciated with large reductions in localized toxic air emissions that occurred in California between 
1990 and 2000, using a data set previously assembled by Banzhaf and Walsh (2008). 
At the core of the data are 25,166 "communities" defined by a set of tangent half-mile di-
ameter circles evenly distributed across the urbanized portion of California.  This approach has 
the virtue of establishing equally sized communities with randomly drawn boundaries, in con-
trast to political and census boundaries which may be endogenous. These neighborhoods are 
matched to the presence of large industrial emitters of air pollution and their emissions levels, as 
recorded in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), in each year from 1990 to 2000.  TRI releases are 
a common measure of pollution in the literature on the relationship between environmental 
quality and demographic composition.
15  Firms handling more than 10,000 pounds each year of 
certain hazardous chemicals have been required to report these emissions since 1987.  This 
censoring at the reporting threshold gives rise to a kind of errors-in variables problem.  As in the 
usual case, this is likely to have a "conservative" effect on our results, biasing them to zero, as 
some exposed communities are included in the control group.  See de Marchi and Hamilton 
(2006) for further discussion of the data.  We use a three-year lagged average of the toxicity-
weighted emissions of all chemicals reported since 1988, looking at the change from 1988-90 to 
1998-2000.
16 
Emissions from each plant are assumed to disperse uniformly over a half-mile buffer 
zone, and are allocated to each residential community accordingly.  The data are also matched to 
1990 and 2000 block-level census data on the total populations of each racial group.  These 
block-level data are aggregated to the circle-communities assuming uniform distributions within 
each block.  See Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) for additional details including summary statistics. 
Ten percent of our communities were exposed to at least some TRI emissions in the base-
                                                 
15 E.g., Arora and Cason (1996), Brooks and Sethi (1997), Kriesel et al. (1996), Morello-Frosch et al. (2001), Rin-
quist (1997), Sadd et al. (1999). 
16 The list of reporting chemicals greatly expanded in 1994. To maintain a consistent comparison of TRI emissions 
over time, we have limited the data to the common set of chemicals used since 1988.  
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line period (1988-1990), with 4 percent of our communities (or approximately 40% of those 
exposed in 1988-1990) losing their exposure by 1998-2000.  Figure 7 shows the link between 
baseline TRI exposure and the 10-year change in emissions.  The figure clearly demonstrates that 
the largest pollution reductions occurred in the communities with the highest baseline emissions.  
Thus, these improvements are consistent with the "large" improvements in low-public good 
communities discussed above. 
Using these data, we test for changes in the structural relationships between race and pol-
lution over time.  In particular, we estimate 
              
      
      
   
      
    
             
   (14)
where   
  is an indicator for whether community j was "exposed" to TRI pollution (i.e. was 
within a half-mile of at least one such facility) in year t and   is the continuous level of air emis-
sions from nearby facilities allocated to community j.  The variable E captures the extensive 
margin and any non-air pollution related disamenity of the polluting facilities (visual, noise, 
smell), while I captures the intensive margin, namely emissions weighted by EPA’s toxicity 
index. 
A key challenge to identifying changes predicted by the model is the likely presence of 
other, confounding location-specific public goods.  Our approach to controlling for unobserved 
spatial amenities is to employ in Lj successively more stringent time-invariant spatial variables, 
including controls for latitude and distance from the coast, school district dummies, and zip code 
dummies.  These effects should capture unobserved public goods that vary on a spatial scale that 
exceeds that of the pollution impacts from TRI facilities.  School district fixed effects have the 
advantage of mapping directly into an important but difficult-to-measure local public good, and 
zip code fixed effects control for locational amenities that vary on spatial scale much smaller 
than that of a school district.   
Table 1 displays the results.  It shows the estimated effects, in each year, of a typical level  
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of exposure in 1990 (for exposed communities).
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The table clearly shows that as the public goods gap shrinks from 1990 to 2000, sorting on race 
increased—precisely the predictions in the model.  As the time-invariant locational controls get 
more local, the estimated levels of the cross-sectional sorting parameter shrink, perhaps because 
of unobservables or perhaps simply because less variation remains for estimating the model.  But 
in all cases, the estimated change in the relationship is consistently around 3 percentage points 
and highly significant.  That is, the effect of a "typical" polluting plant was associated with more 
minorities in both years, but in 2000 the typical plant was associated with an increase in nearby 
minorities 3 percentage points more than was the same sized plant in 1990. 
Moreover, these results are robust to a number of alternative specifications of the model.  
In particular, we estimated the model on only the extensive margin of proximity to a polluting 
facility as well as only the intensive margin of logged emissions.  The results are qualitatively 
similar for these variants of the model.  We also estimated the model separately on the eight 
metropolitan statistical areas in California with populations above 1 million.  Again, the city-
specific results are qualitatively similar to the pooled results, though naturally somewhat less 
precise.
18  Finally, the effects are qualitatively similar if we consider the effect of an average size 
plant in 2000 rather than 1990. 
4.  Conclusions 
Our model suggests that any analysis of the distribution of spatially delineated public goods 
across demographic groups must account for endogenous sorting on those demographics, while 
at the same time studies of spatial patterns in demographics must account for public goods.  That 
                                                 
17 Similar results are obtained by using the average of 2000 emissions as an alternative normalization. 
18 In particular, for all three specifications of the spatial controls, the effect of the normalized level of pollution was 
greater in 2000 than in 1990 for six of the eight metropolitan statistical areas, with the difference being statistically 
significant in four or five of these cities, depending on the model.  The estimated effect of pollution was actually 
smaller in 2000 than in 1990 for two of the eight cities, but the difference is not statistically significant.  Detailed 
results are available from the authors.  
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is, sorting models in the tradition of Tiebout (1956) and tipping models in the tradition of Schel-
ling (1969) are fundamentally connected.  We show that when sorting includes demographics, 
changes in public goods can lead to counter-intuitive results.  In particular, improving public 
good levels in disadvantaged communities can actually increase segregation. 
Schelling's (1969, 1971) original insight into these issues was that complete segregation 
can result even with ubiquitous tastes for some positive level of integration, a result recently 
extended by Pancs and Vriend (2007).  Consequently, modest changes in preferences are unlike-
ly to reduce segregation.  More recently, Bayer et al. (2005) and Sethi and Somanathan (2004) 
find that increasing the number of high socio-economic status minorities in a city actually can 
increase segregation.  They find that such people-based policies have this effect because richer 
minorities now have enough mass to form their own high-income communities. 
Our results suggest that place-based policies pose the same dilemma, but for a different 
reason:  group-based sorting becomes more salient when there is less reason to sort on the ex-
ogenous public good.  Taken in the context of the existing literature, our results contribute to a 
theme that now appears to be growing by accretion.  Apparently, neither changes in tastes nor 
changes in income distributions nor changes in the spatial distribution of public goods are likely 
to reduce the level of segregation in a society.  Little wonder, then, that segregation has been 




Arora, Seema, and Timothy N. Cason. 1999. "Do Community Characteristics Influence Envi-
ronmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory." Southern Economic 
Journal 65(4): 691-716. 
Ash, Michael, and T. Robert Fetter. 2004. "Who Lives on the Wrong Side of the Environmental 
Tracks? Evidence from the EPA's Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators Model." So-
cial Science Quarterly 85: 441–62 
Banzhaf, H. Spencer, and Eleanor McCormick. 2006. "Moving Beyond Cleanup: Identifying the 
Crucibles of Environmental Gentrification." National Center for Environmental Econom-
ics Working Paper 07-02. http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/WPNumberNew/2007-
02?OpenDocument. 
Banzhaf, H. Spencer, and Randall P. Walsh. 2008. "Do People Vote with Their Feet? 
An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism." American Economic Review 98: 843-63. 
Bayer, Patrick, Hanming Fang, and Robert McMillan. 2005. "Separate When Equal? Racial 
Inequality and Residential Segregation." NBER Working Paper 11507.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11507. 
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy.  2000.  Social Economics:  Market Behavior in a Social 
Environment, Chapter 5.  Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press. 
Been, Vicki. 1994. "Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportio-
nate Siting or Market Dynamics?" Yale Law Journal 103: 1383-1422. 
Brooks and Sethi. 1997. "The Distribution of Pollution: Community Characteristics and Expo-
sure to Air Toxics." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32: 233-50. 
Bullard, Robert.  2000.  Dumping in Dixie, 3
rd ed.  Westview Press. 
Cameron, Trudy Ann, and Ian McConnaha. 2006. "Evidence of Environmental Migration." Land 
Economics 82: 273-290. 
Card, David, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein. 2007. "Tipping and the Dynamics of Segrega-
tion." Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
Cutler, David M., Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor. 1999. "The Rise and Decline of the 
American Ghetto." Journal of Political Economy 107(3): 455-506. 
de Marchi, Scott, and James T. Hamilton. 2006. "Assessing the Accuracy of Self-Reported Data: 
An Evaluation of the Toxics Release Inventory." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 32: 57-
76. 
Debreu, Gerard. 1970. "Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria."  Econometrica 38: 387-92. 
Epple, Dennis, Radu Filimon, and Thomas Romer. 1984. "Equilibrium among Local Jurisdic-
tions: Toward an Integrated Approach of Voting and Residential Choice." Journal of 
Public Economics 24: 281-308. 
Farley, Reynolds, Howard Schuman, S. Bianchi, Diane Colasanto, and S. Hatchett. 1978. "Choc- 
29 
 
olate City, Vanilla Suburbs: Will the Trend toward Racially Separate Communities Con-
tinue?" Social Science Research 7: 319-344. 
Farley, Reynolds, and Maria Krysan. 2002. "The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They 
Explain Persistent Segregation?" Social Forces, 80: 937-80. 
Freeman, L. 2005. “Displacement or Succession? Residential Mobility in Gentrifying Neighbor-
hoods” Urban Affairs Review 40(4): 463-491. 
Freeman, L. and F. Braconi. 2004. “Gentrification and Displacement in New York City” Journal 
of the American Planning Association, 70(1): 39-52. 
Ford, Richard Thompson.  1994.  "The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analy-
sis."  Harvard Law Review 107: 1841-1921. 
Glaeser, Edward L., and Jose A. Scheinkman. 2003. "Non-Market Interactions." In Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, 8
th World Congress, Vol. 1, ed. 
by M. Dewatripont, L.P. Hansen, and S. Turnovosky. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 339-69. 
Greenstone, Michael, and Justin Gallagher. 2008. "Does Hazardous Waste Matter? Evidence 
from the Housing Market and the Superfund Program." Quarterly Journal of Economics 
123: 951-1003. 
Hoff, Karla, and Arijit Sen.  2005.  "Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segrega-
tion."  American Economic Review 95: 1167-89. 
Kiel, Katherine A., and Jeffrey E. Zabel.  1996.  "House Price Differentials in US Cities:  
Household and Neighborhood Racial Effects."  Journal of Housing Economics 5: 143-
65. 
Kriesel, Warren, Terence J. Centner, and Andrew G. Keller. 1996. "Neighborhood Exposure to 
Toxic Releases: Are there Racial Inequities?" Growth and Change 27: 479-99. 
McGuire, Martin.  1974.  "Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions."  Journal of Political 
Economy 82: 112-32. 
McKinnish, Terra, Randall Walsh, and T. Kirk White. 2010. “Who Gentrifies Low-Income 
Neighborhoods?” Journal of Urban Economics, 67(2): 180-193. 
Morello-Frosch, Rachel, Manuel Pastor, and James Sadd. 2001. "Environmental Justice and 
Southern California's 'Riskscape': The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and Health 
Risks Among Diverse Communities." Urban Affairs Review 36(4): 551-578. 
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC). 2006. Unintended Impacts of Rede-
velopment and Revitalization Efforts in Five Environmental Justice Communities. Report, 
August. 
Pancs, Romans, and Nicolaas J. Vriend.  2007.  "Schellings’ Spatial Proximity Model of Segre-
gation Revisited."  Journal of Public Economics 91: 1-24. 
Rinquist, Evan J. 1997. "Equity and Distribution of Environmental Risk: The Case of TRI Facili-
ties." Social Science Quarterly 78: 811-829.  
30 
 
Sadd, James L., Manuel Pastor, J. Thomas Boer, and Lori D. Snyder. 1999. "'Every Breath You 
Take…:' The Demographics of Toxic Air Releases in Southern California." Economic 
Development Quarterly 13(2): 107-123. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1969.  "Models of Segregation."  American Economic Review papers and 
proceedings 59: 488-93. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. "Dynamic Models of Segregation." Journal of Mathematical Sociol-
ogy 1: 143-86. 
Sethi, Rajiv, and Rohini Somanathan.  2004.  "Inequity and Segregation."  Journal of Political 
Economy 112: 1296-1321. 
Sieg, Holger, V. Kerry Smith, H. Spencer Banzhaf, and Randy Walsh. 2004. "Estimating the 
General Equilibrium Benefits of Large Changes in Spatially Delineated Public Goods." 
International Economic Review 45(4): 1047-1077. 
Tiebout, Charles. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 
64: 416-424. 
Vigdor, Jacob L. 2202. “Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?” Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Urban Affairs: 133-173. 
Vigdor, Jacob L.  2009.  "Does Environmental Remediation Benefit the Poor?"  Paper presented 
at the Lone Mt. Forum on "The Political Economy of Environmental Justice," Big Sky, 
MT, Oct 2008.  Revised June 2009. 
 31 
 
Figure 1: Community Sorting and Bid Functions                . 
Panel 1:Racial Composition  Panel 2: V Functions 
Panel 3: Y‐Bar  Panel 4: Bid Functions 









































































Figure 2: Community Sorting and Bid Functions       . ,        . 
Panel 1:Racial Composition  Panel 2: V Functions 
Panel 3: Y‐Bar  Panel 4: Bid Functions 









































































Figure 3: Impact of Changes in     on Bid Functions. 
Panel 1 
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Figure 4: Evolution of Equilibria as    Improves.
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Figure 6: Difference in Difference and Cross Sectional Relationships. 
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Table 1. Estimated Effect of Average TRI Exposure in 1990 and 2000 (and Difference) on 
Percent Minority. 
Spatial controls L  Effect in 1990  Effect in 2000  Difference  R
2 







(0.6) (0.8)  (1.0)   






(0.5) (0.7)  (0.8)   






***  0.69 
(0.5) (0.6)  (0.7)   




















1990 ) 0 ( 1
1
.  That is, they are the effect in year t of the 
typical exposure experienced in 1990 (if any) compared to no exposure.  The effect accounts for the extensive 
margin of such "typical exposure" as well as the intensive margin of emission levels. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
***Significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Appendix.   
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We begin by noting that when public good levels are equal:  
(a)                      when PCTw
C1 < 1-β, 
(b)                      when PCTw
C1 > 1-β, and 
(c)                       0  when PCTw
C1 = 1-β. 
(a) is true because Dr
j is highest in the community with more of type j.  With G
C1=G
C2, it follows 
that Vr
j is also higher in that community.  (b) follows by the symmetric logic.  (c) also follows by 




C2.  Observation 4 shows that (a) and (b) are 
associated with segregated equilibria.  As already noted, all segregated equilibria are stable.  
Observation 5 shows that (c) is associated with an integrated equilibrium.  However, this equili-
brium is unstable because as soon as a single type-w individual in C1 switches with a type-b 
individual in C2, then PCTw
C1 < 1-β and we are in case (a).  Likewise, if a type-w individual in 
C2 switches with a type-b individual in C1, we are in case (b). 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The proposition follows directly from Proposition 2 together with the continuity of the boundary 
income bid functions and the implicit function theorem.  It states that the single unstable inte-
grated equilibrium and the segregated equilibrium with all type-b individuals in C2 that are 
present when public goods are equal continues to hold and are the only possible equilibria for at 
least small perturbations in the G’s around this point. 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
We prove this proposition in four steps. 
Part (i). 
We begin by re-writing Equation 4 as follows: 
        
         
     
              
    
      
  
            
    
       
  
            
   
1
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By assumption, BidY → Y as G
C1→-∞.  Thus, by the Inada conditions   
  →∞.  Therefore, for 
sufficiently low G
C1, the entire term in brackets → 0 and we can focus on the first term 
     
       . 
As shown in the text, 
     
          
0.5
          
  0 
     
         
0.5
 1              
  0 
whenever    
       
  .  Therefore, 
        
         0  
and 
        
         0 .  
In other words, the boundary income bid function is monotonically increasing in PCTw
C1 for 
type w and monotonically decreasing for type b. 
Part (ii). 
Next, note that at PCTw
C1=1-2β,     =   
    and     =   
    
 .   
         
   1 2    given β<0.5.  
Again, since Bidy → y, it follows that        =   
    and        =   
   1 2   .  Using Equation 
(1), we then have         >        .    Note that by Observation 4, this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Part (iii) 
Similarly, note that at PCTw
C1=1,     =   
    =0 and     =   
    
 . 
     > 0.  Thus         >        = 0.  
Again, by Observation 4, this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Part (iv) 
We now combine parts (i) to (iii).  By part (ii), we have that at PCTw
C1=1-2β,         >        .  
By part (i), we know         is monotonically decreasing in PCTw
C1 and         is monotonically 
increasing.  By part (iii) we have that at PCTw
C1=1,         <        .  Therefore, the two boun-41 
 
dary income bid functions cross once, with         crossing         from above.  This is a stable 
integrated equilibrium.  Moreover, as noted above the segregated equilibria are ruled out by 
Observation 4.   
Therefore, a single equilibrium exists, it is integrated, and it is stable. 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
By Observation (5), in an integrated equilibrium         =        .  Since BidYr → Y as G
C1→-∞, it 
follows that           =    .  By first order stochastic dominance, F(     /F(      ≥ 1.   
Therefore,  
       
       
 
1        
1        
   
and 
        
 1          
  
  1         
 1    1           
. 
This shows that the ratio of type b to type w is higher in C1 than C2.  Adding 1 written as  
 1    1           
 1    1           
 
to both sides of the equation and inverting both sides leads to  
 1          
 1                      
 
 1    1          
 1    1              1          
, 
which is the desired result. 